For those interested in pursuing my point about an elected second chamber not necessarily being the ‘democratic’ option, you can access the text of the talk I gave last December at a seminar on Lords reform organised by the Leader of the House, Baroness Ashton, on:
http://www.lordsleader.gov.uk/files/pdf/Dec_07_PN_Leaders_Seminar.pdf
My starting point is the form of constitution I favour for the United Kingdom. I develop the case that ensuring democratic accountability of government to the people requires maintaining a system in which there is one body – the party in government – that is chosen through elections to the House of Commons and is answerable to the people at the next election. There is no divided responsibility: the people know who to hold responsible. Once you move from core accountability to divided accountability (the product of two elected, but not necessarily co-equal, chambers) you undermine that core accountability.
It is possible to take a different view deriving from another principled approach to constitutional change. I am quite happy to debate Lords reform deriving from first principles. My problem with the White Paper is that it does not derive from first principles; it makes assertions but makes no attempt to develop an argument derived from a clear articulated view of what our constitution is for.
Am thoroughly enjoying the flurry of blog posts on the subject of reform. Thank you Lord Norton and the other Lords who’ve taken the time to discuss the matter on this blog.
For clarification: the ‘liberal approach’ is in favour of an elected House of Lords. Does the liberal approach really seek a fragmentation of power, or is it just an unfortunate by-product of the method chosen? Maybe the proponents of an elected second house view this as a necessary evil, secondary to the need to rid Parliament of cronyism. This is not mentioned in the Lords Reform seminar attachment, yet it is the problem with the input legitimacy of an appointed second chamber. Maybe I’m wrong and there is no problem, if so the myth should be debunked.
Let’s see if I can get this ‘first principles’ malarkey right. We start with positive constitutionalism, the lower house expresses the general will, and the upper house tempers it. In particular:
1. The House of Lords is primarily a check and balance on the elected House of Commons.
2. Core accountability rests with the House of Commons.
3. The House of Lords adds value by fulfilling functions that the first chamber may not have the time, political will or resources to fulfil while conceding supremacy to the elected chamber (paraphrased from the Lords Reform seminar attachment).
4. As the public have a tendency to elect career-politicians, all of whom are from similar cultural and ethnic backgrounds, to the House of Commons; the House of Lords complements this by being diverse. It is representative by attempting to be socially typical, unlike the Commons.
5. Further to point four, diversity is also expressed in the number of expert peers in the Lords: professors, lawyers, ex-heads of government departments etc.
Maybe this list mixes ideas and is confused. It is almost definitely incomplete and over-simplified, for example: how do the Law Lords fit into this picture?
The conclusion of the seminar attachment is, the best method for obtaining and keeping a House of Lords, adherent to first principles, is by appointment of its members. Whether you agree or disagree with this, appointment has problems of its own: the perception of cronyism, cash for peerages scandals, the image of an old boys club. My fear is, while members are appointed, the upper house will not be taken seriously by the public. It is important for the House of Lords to be well regarded, as some enterprising pillock, from the lower house, may get away with abolishing, or reforming it into oblivion.
What about a hybrid election/appointment system that goes from first principles, but fixes the issues surrounding appointments? The Appointments Commission could change its role from suggesting names, to suggesting the attributes of the person they’re looking for (almost like determining requirements for a job advert, but more distinguished, of course). Then, instead of a general election, Lords could be elected by the group of people who share their attributes. Professors, religious groups, physicists, biologists, computer scientists et al. all send representatives to the House of Lords. I can’t see the benefit of these being less than life peerages, nor is there any reason to alter renumeration either. Nor is there need for the turkeys to suffer Christmas: the existing peers could remain, with only new ones being elected.
This suggestion is not blunt democracy, it’s targeted. The upper house is still diverse and full of experts (possibly more-so than with appointments). Most importantly the function of the upper house is not changed: it remains a check and balance, and the Commons would hold core accountability.
On a side note: were Welsh and Scottish devolution handled differently then there might be some advantage to having elected Lords to represent each state (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales). Creating a federal government, in effect. Shame it’s too late for that idea.
My apologies if the above suggestion is a pet scheme, I’d be interested to get a better understanding of negative and positive constitutionalism (just a link, a book name or whatnot would be great). Also is ‘first principles’ Platonic?
Liam: Thanks for a very stimulating response. On the liberal approach, a fragmentation of power is core to achieving the constitution that the approach stipulates. (The liberal approach is developed in my ‘The Constitution in Flux’. The book itself is now dated but the approaches it outlines have not changed.) You have grasped the essential elements of the argument I developed, but I very much take your points about the appointments process. I was responsible for drafting the House of Lords Bill, introduced this session by Lord Steel of Aikwood, and Part 1 of the Bill seeks to create a an independent appointments commission. I very much favour a pro-active commission, able to identify not only the type of person appropriate for appointment but also any gaps in the knowledge of the House that need to be filled. The commission would be transparent, working on the basis of published guidelines and apppointing on the basis of conspicuous merit. Much of this is embodied in the Bill. You seek to go further by taking up a proposal variously made in recent years, namely that peers should be selected/elected by different groups. This is a perfectly valid argument, though I have some concerns about producing members who may therefore feel obliged to act as delegates ot mouthpieces for the very bodies that elected them rather than serving as individuals and expressing their own views. On the broad principle, though, there is not really anything that divides us. In so far as it is a pet scheme, it is a considered one designed to deliver on a particular principle.
Your post is very interesting and does give food for thought – though I think it is important to emphasise the ‘Tony’s Cronies’ accusations were a symptom of the early 2000s when the Labour government spent a lot of time appointing a lot of Labour peers to bring up their numbers, and such appointments were exclusively the Prime Minister’s gift – through the Queen.
Now however we have the Appointments Commission, whose work highlighted the ‘Cash for Peerages’ scandal – evidence that the Commission is doing its job properly. It’s now harder for the crony and bribery tags to be laid, though it’s by no means impossible.
And finally, the image of an old boys club – unfortunately, I do not think that’s something that can be easily dispelled, as it’s a view usually held by those who **simply do not bother to appraise themselves of the facts.**
I mean, a lot of people I speak to still assume it’s a majority Tory, overwhelmingly hereditary chamber – which is clearly out of date.
The important thing is to educate people about how our constitution works and for what purpose, which I’m sorry to say does appear to be quite lacking in this country, leading to all sorts of mistaken assumptions.
For a humble tax-payer like me this debate is getting a little too intellectual. All I want to know is: how much would an elected House cost? Would that be a cost worth paying? And would it be more than the Lords as currently constituted costs?
The arrangements for appointment Liam suggests seem to me very similar to the way in which much of the Irish Senate is elected — through vocational panels. Theoretically this is supposed to bring diverse expertise into the Senate, but I think it is generally recognized that the system was quickly hijacked by politicians with few real qualifications. Perhaps strict regulations as to who is eligible for election would solve that, but personally I am sceptical.
An appointment-based system, while susceptible to accusations of abuse and cronyism, is in my opinion still the best method. If appointments are made in a wholly non-partisan manner, by people qualified to judge the merits of the various nominees better than electors might, I suspect the resulting House would be a more fitting continuation of the Lords tradition. The important thing is to fix the current system; personally I would rather have a hereditary House than one appointed largely by political parties.
Adrian Kidney and cmcqueeny: I agree with your basic points. Yes, the arrangements Liam suggest are not dissimilar to those that pertain in Ireland for the functional second chamber. I agree that education is essential and that an independent appointments commission is the best route for selecting members.
howridiculous: how much would it cost? You may not be surprised to know that this is another notable failing of the White Paper. It doesn’t cost the proposals. It says costings will be worked up ‘once there are firmer proposals’ [this is supposed to be a White Paper!]. It suiggests members be salaried, with salaries somewhere between those paid to members of the devolved assemblies and those paid to MPs. However, it says ‘The Government’s intention is to ensure that the costs of a reformed second chamber are maintained at current levels or lower’. I am sorry, but this is complete nonsense. It proposes a chamber of 400+ members with salaries of £50,000 or thereabouts. The combined salary bill will far exceed the current total of peers’ expenses, a figure which includes travel costs. Travel costs will be additional to salaries. This is before one factors in the absence of provision for the new full-time salaried members having secretaries and research assistants. And, if the members are salaried, then what about pensions? Unless the Government plan to sack the existing staff (clerks, attendants, etc) and not have any staff to support the institution, I don’t see how they can make their claim make any sense. This, I fear, is indicative of the White Paper.
Lord Norton,
I have a cunning plan, as Baldrick might have said…
There has been some success in Wales with saving those old red phone boxes. Less success in saving Post Offices. But we’ve kept many old train lines [e.g. to Tenby, Llandeilo] which would have been chopped by Beeching’s axe had they been in England [Wales being a smaller, cwtsh-ier country things are on a smaller scale..].
And Boris Johnson has said he will bring back the Routemaster.. With this in mind, why not borrow some ideas from his website about how to preserve the best of the old design, but with a fresh, modern touch, and improve your democratic image, by allowing the people to help with the design ? You know it couldn’t possibly be worse than anything which Jack Straw has cobbled together.. See below..
http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/corporate/projectsandschemes/technologyandequipment/anewbusforlondon/default.aspx
Wow, thank you for the responses! I learnt a lot in writing that comment, thanks to the learned Lord Norton’s seminar paper.
Very true, it could lead to lobbyists and special interest groups gaining disproportional representation. It seems that introducing any form of elected elements into the upper house will cause dilution of accountability. Although electing life peers would help, once you’re in, you’re in and you can say what you like. 🙂
Agreed, you’ve convinced me (for what it’s worth!) that there isn’t much to be changed with the House of Lords. It could be tweaked a little, an elected element — carefully — added, the Appointments Commission made independent. However the upper house’s function and place within the constitution should not be changed, and if it is to be changed, the person with the scheme had better think how the whole system is going to work, not just the upper house.
This white paper has not been well thought through. Good catch by howridiculous: no costings, and the ridiculous assertion that it will be cheaper, makes the job of discrediting the paper almost too easy.
I’m off to buy a copy of Lord Norton’s book! 😀
Lord Norton,
What do you think of the Canadian system with regard to their Senate?
On paper, it’s appointed like ours (minus the hereditaries and the Lords Spiritual), but there is (I think) a cap on numbers permitted, and the Prime Minister can only appoint those to replace any which have died or retired.
Furthermore, some provinces elect ‘nominee’ Senators, which the Prime Minister is free to select or turn down at will, but at least allows for the Provincial populations to give a view of what they would like to represent them…
Having said that, I feel a federal Britain would be unworkable, given England’s economic and demographic dominance.
But would you say at least a cap on numbers permitted (say, maximum 800) would be a suitable measure for the Lords?
I’m just throwing ideas really.
Bedd Gelert: Thanks for the suggestion: I checked the link and I take your point. I have already pursued one or two ideas suggested in comments on the blog with the relevant authorities; I’ll pursue this one as well.
Liam: Thanks for the further comments. I fear you may have problems in obtaining a copy of ‘The Constitution in Flux’ – it sold well for two decades but is now out of print, and second-hand copies are difficult to get hold off. Mind you, if you can get a copy, it will probably be cheaper than another of mine that is now also out of print and is like gold-dust, and probably costs as much as gold-dust: ‘Legislatures’ was published as a £10 paperback, but the only copies available via Amazon are £240 or more!
Adrian Kidney: The Canadian Senate is often compared with the House of Lords because it is an appointed second chamber, but it works far less well and is suffering from what look likely to be more successful attempts to change it to an elected chamber. The UK is not likely to be a federal nation, not least because – as you touch upon – it has only four component parts and one of those is dominant, containing in excess of 80% of the population and 80% of the wealth. I would not necessarily be against a cap on numbers: it would impose a useful discipline. However, if we had a cap I think it would need to be accompanied by the opportunity for members who no longer wish or are no longer able to contribute to proceedings to be able to retire.
This incredibly important debate on the future of the Lords has been completely debased by Straw and his Andrex paper. We have a default government created by an unelected PM. Unelected but selected.
Nobody has or will be casting their vote in a general election based on what candidates want to happen to the HoL. The argument that the majority party in the Commons have a democratic mandate to do what they want does not hold since not one candidate will have included how they will vote on the subject of the reform of the HoL. This is not a small subject and I, for one, will question my pre-selected wannabes on this.
The government is the chosen few selected (yes, that word again) from the majority party who put a 3-line whip on to ensure victory for whatever piece of legislation. The HoL may not agree but what the heck, the government will override them and use the Parliament Act.
If that’s the democracy you want, then opt for what Scotland has done and don’t bother with a second house. Do have a close look at the legislation their committee’s have produced, thus far, and the costs before diving into that pool of sharks.
If you want a wholly or 80% elected second house, as the Commons do, you are likely to believe the MPs are a shining example for the nation to look up to and do a damn fine job for little reward.
Appointed members of a second house does not mean they are pre-selected, as are MPs. True, it is unlikely your neighbour will be appointed but not impossible, a bit similar to the magistrates appointment process.
I still don’t know why change is needed.
It sounds reasonable. I won’t ask you to elaborate on the Canadian Senate’s troubles as I’m sure you don’t specialise on theirs! I will have to investigate…
Adrian Kidney: The method of selecting Senators in Canada militates against it having the level of independence ascribed to the House of Lords. There is not the same emphasis on experience and expertise. It also suffers from operating within the context of a relatively weak parliament. A parliamentary career in the federal parliament is not something that is particularly sought and the turnover of MPs is high (especially so by UK standards). The power tends to lie at the executive level in Ottawa and the provinces.
Ladytizzy: I agree. I have still not heard a compelling argument for change. Survey data show that the public tend to prefer the attributes of the present House over election.