Given the negative coverage that the Lords has received recently, it is nice to see that Rachel Sylvester has an article in The Times in which she argues “there is a danger of learning the wrong lessons from this incident and of losing sight of what is good about the Upper Chamber”. She makes the case for the positive features of the House – the knowledge of the members, the less partisan atmosphere, and the willingness to stand up to government – and identifies the dangers that would derive from electing the second chamber.
As she concludes “There is an appealing logic to the argument for an elected senate but, if enacted, the idea would turn out to be deeply flawed. Be careful what you wish for lest it come true. “
Sylvester is particularly good at emphasising the result of no one party enjoying a majority in the House of Lords: ‘If the Government wants to win a division in the Upper Chamber, it must first win the argument.’ This means that ‘the debates in the Lords are usually of a far higher quality than those in the Commons. There is an emphasis on making intelligent points rather than on point-scoring–exactly the sort of “new politics” all the party leaders claim to want but never deploy.’
If I may raise one caveat, it is with her advocacy of term limits. As Burke wrote (in a slightly different context), ‘Just as these magistrates begin to learn their trade, like chimney-sweepers, they are disqualified for exercising it.’ One could make a term long enough to encompass experience and institutional know-how, but then the question becomes ‘if 15 years, then why not 20?’ and so on (see the current debate on the retirement ages for judges).
The question of term-limits–8-12 years–has been raised with respect to Canadian senators, who must in any event retire at 75; with a constitutional minimum age requirement of 30 years, one could ‘retire’ at the grand old age of 38 or 42: creating not a very credible Red Chamber of ‘sober second thought’.
After 3.. You have to Ac-Cent-Tchu-Ate The Positive..Eeliminate the negative..
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=Pi8o3OWiDIE&feature=related
“Be careful what you wish for lest it come true.”
Ain’t that the truth..
My Lord Norton,
You may also like to read this article in the Scotsman:
http://news.scotsman.com/geraldwarner/Gerald-Warner-Real-sleaze-can.4934368.jp
It’s a bit vitriolic against the Commons and I’m not wholeheartedly behind his advocacy of the hereditaries (though I suspect he’s being flippant), but I think the message is true.
I’d agree with much of the above. It did more than exasperate me that the usual cries of ‘elect the house’ went up seemingly missing the point that the accusations (as yet unproven) are against four formerly elected politicians. Especially in a week when a number of MPs have had to apologise or pay back money for rule violations.
I doubt I’m alone in respecting/preferring those sections of the house – the academics/military/judges/Security and other professionals to MPs kicked upstairs to keep the party numbers up. I can’t see any system in which the former would stand for election and the house can’t afford to lose their experience.
Lord Norton: Do you have a sense from you time in the house if thoughtful debate is becoming more/less common -v- partisan speeches. Obviously you caught the very tail end of the old house and then the massive influx of new peers.
@Adrian: Reading your link, there is certainly a small but vocal section of Scottish Catholicism for whom the recognition of the Jacobite past and recognition of such ‘titles’ is an ongoing sore. It’s not so long ago I saw a report of the funeral of David Lumsden of Cushnie stating that Lady Mar “was pointedly addressed by Jacobites (attending) as “Your Grace”.”
Its strange to see an article lauded here that contains the line:
“It is fashionable to use the recent allegations to make the case for an elected House of Lords. But this would be yet another step down the road of creating a professional political class – precisely the thing the voters detest.”
Ouch! With friends like that…
Its almost as if she didn’t realize that a professional political class is exactly the thing created by the current system. Moreover, now that the uk is starting to piece together a proper supreme court it is no longer clear that the bastion of expertise argument is decisive. This is especially true at a time when most Britons believe that the uk is less democratic and accountable than it once was and has abandoned many of the bedrock principles of liberal government. A directly elected second house that ran candidates rather than parties would be accountable to voters in a way that the lords could never be. While we may lose some amount of quality debate, most would willingly trade that for a more participatory democracy. Issues that the parties refuse to touch, like the gradual seceding of sovereignty to the EU, could finally be addressed in a way which reflected the concerns of the citizens.
B: An elected second chamber would contribute to the rise of a professional political class in a way that the House of Lords did not and does not. One of the great things about the House is that appointment allows people outside the political class to be drawn into membership. And an elected second chamber may increase accountability at the level of the individual member while undermining or destroying it at the collective level. I always react rather strongly to claims that election of a second chamber (as opposed to the first) is democratic and enhances accountability. Election of a second chamber fragments accountability and undermines the accountability of government of electors. These points are developed in my article:
http://www.effectivesecondchamber.com/d/AddingValue.pdf
B,
Every democratic state in the world has a professional political class and every state considers theirs to have been subverted and their voice not heard. I’m not saying that all is completely fine, but the cry is not unique to Britain and much of it is inescapable pessimism.
I have something like it in my work, where despite how much the management implore people to provide input into departmental policy, nobody bothers to say anything and yet they *still* gripe that they haven’t been consulted.
Moreover, the coming Supreme Court of the UK is nothing like a *proper* supreme court. I presume you’re referring the something like what the US has. Unfortunately it won’t do anything of the sort but will continue the same fine work that the House of Lords currently does but in a more exposed and possibly more politicised position.
Trouble brewing..
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/michaelcrick/2009/02/troubles_for_straw.html
Organic Tory: Thanks for your comments. I agree completely with your commemnts about term limits. I am not in favour of them. I know the argument for them but I regard them as mechanistic devices which can militate against retaining the best.
Croft: on your query, I haven’t detected a great change. There is still an emphasis on serious debate and overtly partisan speeches are frowned upon. Wholly partisan speeches are rather pointless – they don’t get picked up outside, they irritate other members, and they are generally an indication that you have nothing of substance to contribute. Many of our debates – not least general debates on Thursdays and Questions for Short Debate (QSDs) – are on topics outside the context of party conflict and are frequently characterised by informed, sometimes fascinating, speeches.
Adrian Kidney: Thanks for the link. As you indicate, it is rather OTT on the Commons.
LordNorton: I’ve just read your PDF which was interesting, I wasn’t quite clear though where you felt on specialised roles. I’ve personally always been rather in favour of some form of confirmation hearings – say for members of the MPC/major quangos/Law lords. The Lords as a less partisan body could (as many upper houses does elsewhere) perform this distinct function and it would take some power away from the executive and unaccountable selection bodies.
Lord Norton,
If I understand your argument correctly, you claim that the election of a second house has the ability to undermine the accountability of the popularly elected government because conflict between branches of govt or between houses results in distortions to policy that the public has trouble discerning and, thus, punishing in the next round of elections.
This is a fair criticism but I wonder if it does not also apply to the house of lords. After all, as you note, the lords has offered thousands of amendments to bills that would, presumably, have effects at the policy level. If such changes come to impact voters they will respond by holding the govt accountable and so it would seem that the issue of wrongly holding one body accountable for mischief instigated by the other would be an issue here as well.
I also want to take a moment to dispute the claim that the lords has not and does not result in a permanent political class. Perhaps my understanding of history is deficient, but it is my understanding that the lords was first created in order to transform a militarily powerful group that could threaten the king into a body that would wield politics as a weapon instead. If this is the case then the creation of a permanent political class was exactly what was intended and created. But perhaps you are referring to the more recent reforms of 1999. While those reforms sought to put true expertise into the house at the expense of heredity, I think it prudent to ask whether the lords, on the whole, function more as experts in their particular field or whether they act as politicians first.
To be sure this delves into some very subjective matters but I will say this about expertise. Expertise is at least sustained, if not created, by the clash of equally well informed but different ideas purporting to explain the same phenomena. As such we would only expect expertise to really flourish in a culture of, informed, conflict. It is not clear that this is provided by the lords. I often see debates which should turn on matters of hard evidence fall to the anecdotal stories of supposed experts. (see http://lordsoftheblog.wordpress.com/2008/12/01/sink-skunk/) It is for this reason that I am suspicious of the claimed expertise of the lords. Too often the expert’s mere opinion seems to carry the debate.
Admittedly this is a contentious claim.
That said, the source of my frustration is that I fail to see the commons as truly accountable in the first place because party platforms invariably seem to lack coherence and none does a good job of speaking to my interests. As such I fail to be moved by arguments which purport to preserve this accountability.
B: You are correct in your interpretation of my argument. In terms of the Lords, the House accepts the political supremacy of the Commons and therefore does not challenge the claim that the Commons is entitled ultimately to get its way. The Commons essentially decides the ends of legislation; the Lords does not seek to challenge that – which is why the practice is not to vote on the Second Reading of Government Bills – but focuses instead on the detail. Our role is to improve the content of the Bills and all the amendments we make have to be confirmed by the Commons. If the Commons do not accept an amendment, they can ultimately override the Lords through the use of the Parliament Acts. That way, the Government through the Commons remains ultimately accountable.
On a political class, I was thinking not just of the recent reforms but more especially the 1958 Act. Peers may vote or act in a political way, and as such may now form (as members of a chamber of the legislature) part of a political class, but my point is that they are not necessarily drawn from a political class. I note that your claim that peers may rely on anecdote is itself anecdotal. Debate in the chamber may well see contested claims by experts and there is a difference between experts and those who claim to rest their argument on points put forward by ‘experts’.
On the Commons, parties are not that bad at generating programmes of public policy and delivering on them. Despite the criticisms levelled at parties, they have a very good record of delivering on manifesto promises. Political parties are, by their nature, catch-all parties, and so it is difficult for one to espouse policies that will coincide precisely with the views of each elector. That is one reason, I would hypothesise, why we have witnessed a massive increase in the number of interest groups, particularly single-issue groups, absorbing the energies of citizens committed to the particular causes pursued. At one level, this is a healthy development, but at another – by drawing interest away from political parties – it is disturbing. This is not necessarily a problem specific to the UK.
Croft: I take your point. There is a case for hearings, not least by Lords Committees for the reasons you give. I would not be in favour, though, of the committees having a veto. They are not the appointing bodies. However, a hearing may be useful in enabling the appointee to explain his or her approach to the post and a committee report endorsing the appointment may help reinforce the acceptance of the appointment.
LordNorton: If the committee has no power to in extremis veto (or much better and my preference to be able if they are unhappy to refer the matter to the whole house to decide) them it would seem little more than a rubber stamp. We have had an explosion of quangoes and bodies which increasing make decisions that would formerly have been decided at ministerial or council level that now have no line of parliamentary or democratic accountability. However much appointment bodies may be good people and make generally the right decisions they ought to have some mechanism of accountability. Is it really that much of a stretch from the present where a small number of offices are decided by votes in parliament. Something of what I was thinking appears in the section 3/4 and 5 of the Government Powers (Limitation) Bill (02-3 session) which I’ve just found.
I’d welcome a way to restore a line of accountability in another way but I can’t see an easy method.